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| "We will support the officials just so long as they represent the workers, but we will act independently immediately they misrepresent them" |
The "Red Clydeside" first put itself on the map in
the agitated years of the First World War. Since then, it has received plenty
of examination. It has been portrayed as a possible revolution in the making;
one that could have formed a link with the Bolsheviks and the Spartacists. The
Clyde Workers' Committee was the main body in the agitation of the period. It
was an unofficial industrial organization of the type that is today favoured by
various claimants to the Bolshevik title.
When Britain entered the war in August 1914, the Clyde area
joined in the nationwide enthusiasm. Yet soon after, it proved to be an area
that would tolerate opponents of the war who were elsewhere reviled. John
MacLean, in particular, soon became noted for his pugnacious attitude. A member
of the British Socialist Party,[1]
the local members shared his stand along with Independent Labour Party and
Socialist Labour Party members. All three groups were relatively strong in the
area although only the ILP had any significant strength.
At first the
recalcitrance of part of the population was not strong enough to warrant any
special attention. More important was the production of munitions from the
local engineering works. The government had soon realized that success in the
war depended as much on the armaments as the bodies that could thrown into the
fray. Clydeside as an engineering centre was thus under heavy scrutiny on the
home front.
Trouble first arose over the negotiation of a wage agreement
by the local engineers. The skilled craftsmen who had lost out on the last
deal, put in a pace-setting claim for 2d an hour which the employers rejected.
Early in 1915, an overtime ban and then a strike in support of the claim
brought patriotic wrath down on them. The executive of the men's union, the
Amalgamated Society of Engineers, had already pledged its support for the war
effort and condemned the strike. With no official support, the strike was
organized by the shop stewards — a growing influence in the Union. A ballot
conducted by the ASE showed a 10-1 majority against the acceptance of an offer
by the employers. However, with no strike money and in an atmosphere of slander
and government threats, the strike folded after two weeks. In the end they half
of their original claim.
The gulf between the Clyde militants and their union widened
during the year. The ASE executive signed the Treasury Agreement and a
referendum endorsed this.[2] Then
the passing of the Munitions Act in July established the ground on which the
CWC was to form. The Act, to be applied to munitions work, outlawed strikes,
abolished restrictive practices and limited the right to leave a job.
Prosecutions and convictions followed and the weak response of union officials
to this prompted the establishment of the Clyde Workers' Committee in November.
The CWC was based on the organization that had developed
during the second strike. Their manifesto proclaimed the Committee's aim as the
defence of the trade union rights summarily abolished by the Munitions Act. It
claimed to be " . . . composed of Delegates from every shop . . .
untrammelled by obsolete rule or law . . . We can act immediately according to
the merits of the case and the desire of the rank and file." This was a
challenge to the government and was soon recognised as such. Government
officials began discussing the best way to dispose of this obstacle to their
plans.
Unrelated to the activities of the CWC, the 1915 rent strike
was coming to a conclusion at about the same time. The war had brought an
influx of workers into an area already infamous for its housing and the
landlords had been raising rents to an extent that earned them the title —
"the Huns at home". A rent strike had been in progress and in
November some men were taken to court to get unpaid rent stopped from their
wages. On the day of the case a number of sporadic strikes took place and a
demonstration outside the courtroom threatened a wider strike unless the rises
were stopped. The cases were dismissed and soon after rents were frozen. This
was done seemingly on demand in order to avoid what would have been, in the
government's eyes, unnecessary trouble (and, even more important, more wage
disputes).
Meanwhile the CWC was more concerned with the looming threat
of dilution. In recent years, the development of new techniques had been making
the skills of the engineering craftsman increasingly redundant. The ASE, in
which most of them were organized, had resisted this threat to their
livelihoods by a closed-shop policy designed to keep semi-skilled workers and
their lower wages out of the craftsman's traditional preserves. In this they
had a measure of success with the results that their skills were often
under-used and the employers reluctant to introduce new methods. This was an
obvious obstacle to the government's demand for the maximum output of armaments
and they were determined that it should go. A greater division of labour was to
be brought in and dilutees, mainly women, were to be put on much of the work.
In the short term this would have no effect on the engineers as there was an
overwhelming demand for them. However, when the war was over it was likely that
ASE members would find a restricted market for their abilities in a modernized
industry.
The CWC was now operating regularly with 250-300 delegates
attending their weekly meetings. The most representative delegations came from
the heavy engineering works and this was reflected in the composition of the
small working committee. This included men from the ILP, BSP and SLP with the
latter having the most coherent influence.
The CWC was not an anti-war organization and this was shown
by the policy adopted to meet dilution. This, in contradiction to the ASE,
accepted the inevitability of dilution but wanted nationalization and workers'
participation in management in return. This led to the expulsion from the CWC
of two of MacLean's associates who wanted opposition to the war effort, not
workers' participation in the management of it.
It was wishful thinking to believe that any great
opportunity was missed by the consequent split between the CWC and MacLean.
Quite simply, when it came to the crunch they were concerned with industrial
matters where he was concerned to oppose the war. After this, he and a small
band of supporters, interrupted by jail sentences, continued with tenacious
opposition gaining much sympathy but no real support. Despite his principled
stand, MacLean's optimistic illusions about the development of the Irish
nationalist and Bolshevik movements show that he did not understand Socialism
and what was required to achieve it.
The CWC ignored political reality in pursuing their dilution
policy. Regardless of the implications of their demands, they made no provision
to back them up. On a visit to Glasgow in December, Lloyd George, the Minister
of Munitions, contemptuously dismissed the proposals. Later, after the
Minister's stormy meeting with 3,000 workers, and ILP and a BSP paper were
suppressed for printing truthful accounts of the proceedings.
Con Friel
[1] The BSP was basically the Social Democratic
Federation under a new name. Statements in some publications that the BSP was a
breakaway from SDF are wrong.
[2] Of 190,000 eligible to vote, 18,000 were
for and 4,000 against. (Quoted in "The First Shop Stewards Movement"
by James Hinton.)
Part 2
The Clyde Workers' Committee resistance was broken after
government intervention in Glasgow. In January 1916, workers at Beardmore's
(whose strong representation in the CWC proved to be a maverick one) accepted a
dilution scheme contrary to the CWC policy. Next month, the suppression of the
CWC's paper, three associated arrests, a dispute at Beardmore's over the
working of the dilution agreement, and subsequent strikes on these issues
provided the opportunity for the removal of those identified as the trouble-makers.
Eventually, seven were jailed and a further ten deported to other parts of
Britain.
The Government's attack revealed disunity and a lack of
resolve within the CWC and they went down without much of a fight. It was
basically a weak organization. Like all so-called "rank-and-file"
groups, the most significant thing about them was that they embraced less of
the rank and file than the parent unions. Unable to gain any support from them,
the place where their particular concerns were most relevant, they were never
likely to do anything more substantial. Mindless of this, they challenged a
government with dictatorial powers and were slapped down.
Till late 1917 the truncated CWC was subdued, taking no part
in the engineers' struggle as it developed in England. In the same year, the
political climate on Clydeside began to change. The liberation of the prisoners
and deportees, the turmoil in Russia and the growing war-weariness all combined
to raise the temperature. The CWC revived and in January 1918 stated opposition
to the war. However, no action was ever taken to support this. Possibly, they
had realized by this time that David only beats Goliath in fairy tales.
After the war's end, unemployment began to grow. The idea
had also been developing that the time was ripe for cutting the working week.
Inevitably, the two issues became linked with the aim of cutting hours to
reduce unemployment. Early in 1919, local union officials and shop stewards met
with Glasgow Trades Council and eventually resolved to issue a call for a
general strike in support of a 40-hour week.
The strike began on January 27th with mixed success. There
was a wide response from shipbuilding and engineering but power and transport,
two prime targets, continued. After a few days, 100,000 were claimed to be out.
Contact with the authorities began on the 29th when a deputation asked the Lord
Provost of Glasgow to put the strikers' demands to the government. This he did,
but not in the way that the strikers intended. He wired to London representing
the strike as an unconstitutional threat and indicated that the strikers'
request was an ultimatum. This was partly true, as the mass picket had been
introduced to "induce" recalcitrant workers to come out. The
government decided to hold fire in the absence of a more obvious challenge but
to make the preparations to enable quick military intervention if necessary.
Mindful of similar discontent in Belfast and recent events in Russia and
Germany, they were prepared to take no chances.
Oblivious to these developments, the strikers returned on
the 31st to hear the reply to the Provost's telegram. While a deputation went
to see the Provost, trouble broke out among the thousands outside in George
Square. A tramcar trying to pass through the throng was stopped and police drew
batons to try to clear a way. Violence then spread throughout the Square and
the Riot Act was read. Although there were allegations of plots by both sides
no proof of any premeditation was produced.
By morning, troops were on guard in the city and six tanks
were being held in reserve. Attempts were now made to spread the strike but the
most hopeful effort was averted by the government. Power workers in London
threatened to black-out the city but after the wartime Defence of the Realm Act
was invoked to make the strike illegal, the Electrical Trades Union backed
down. Within another week the strike was over.
The strike failed to go outside the West of Scotland and had
failed to become general within that area. The need for mass pickets was proof
of the lack of support from many workers, and any "induced" to strike
were hardly likely to be reliable.
The end of the strike was claimed to be a tactical retreat
to organize a better effort, but the movement died. The most significant political
outcome of the period was the election to parliament in 1923 of 10 ILP members
from the 15 Glasgow constituencies. The Labour Party has dominated politics in
the area ever since. Others joined the new Communist Party, and that has also
remained relatively strong in the area. From then on, energies were
concentrated on the mainstream of British politics, and the idea of Clydeside
as a maverick area within the nation was largely dead. Against this trend was
MacLean. He formed the nationalist Scottish Workers' Republican Party which
withered away after his death in 1923.
The most notable thing about the period was the parochialism
of the activities. They were always centred on Clydeside and mainly in the
engineering industry. However, they faced a capitalist class organized
nationally and proved no match. This lesson seems to have been realized by the
end of the 40-hours strike.
As a possible revolutionary movement, the Clydesiders were
non-starters. Apart from the occasional pronouncement, nearly all their actions
were in support of purely industrial aims. The exception was the rent strike.
As the government had no real opposition to their aims, however, the
achievement was not great.
The events of early 1916 and early 1919 show that the power
of the state must be treated very seriously. Capitalist democracy, paltry
though it may be by Socialist standards, is well enough organized to defeat any
minority. Just as important, on the same basis it is possible for a
revolutionary majority to gain control of political power. However, this is not
enough. Capitalism is organized on a world scale operating through national
units and, thus, any serious challenge to this order of society must follow the
same pattern. This is an enormous task but it is the only one that fits the
measure of the Socialist aim.
Con Friel
Glasgow Branch
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